Can Obama learn anything from the way Pres. Clinton recovered from electoral disaster for Dems in '94? I hope; he needs to go to the political center.
Gerald F. Seib writes in The Wall Street Journal:
[In 1994 and today,] a political statement made by voters seemed to invite a rethink of strategy and tactics.
The conventional wisdom says Mr. Clinton responded to that 1994 debacle by moving to the political center. In the parlance of the time, he began to "triangulate," or to take stands that positioned him between liberals of his own party and conservatives of the Republican Party.
That's certainly true, but a bit of an oversimplification. Mr. Clinton didn't simply reposition himself, but also shifted his priorities.
Famously, of course, he left behind efforts to overhaul health care. Then, in 1995, Mr. Clinton went against his party's orthodoxy by embracing a plan to balance the federal budget. And in 1996, he moved against Democratic orthodoxy again, by embracing a plan for wholesale changes to the welfare system.
He hardly turned his back on his own party in the process, though. Instead, he embraced more-conservative goals, while sometimes rejecting Republican tactics for achieving them. Thus, though he agreed on a plan to balance the budget, he confronted the GOP from the left on the specifics of spending bills designed to get that done. He vetoed a series of appropriations bills in 1995, ultimately leading to a temporary shutdown of much of the federal government that fall—which turned into a political disaster for Republicans, who absorbed most of the blame for letting it happen.
He also vetoed two versions of a welfare overhaul before finally signing a third in late 1996. Changing welfare was politically popular and, again, Mr. Clinton was the most obvious political beneficiary of the exercise.
In sum, Mr. Clinton engaged the opposition in a substantive way, while also reserving the right to battle with them over specifics. That repositioned the Clinton White House politically, of course, but also had the effect of compelling the Republicans to take a full share of responsibility. By engaging Republicans, in effect, he forced them to take a stake in failure as well as success.
So how much of this script could Mr. Obama follow? In his initial response to the Massachusetts loss, there was a hint of a move to the political center, particularly in his suggestion that he reposition himself on health care.
Similarly, the White House's emerging new focus on attacking the budget deficit will reposition Mr. Obama toward the middle on an issue that has great appeal there right now.
On other hand, the White House's move to double down on more regulation of big banks presages a much harder populist line, which is less in keeping with the Clinton reaction. And obviously, Mr. Obama simply can't move too far away from his party's congressional wing, which today, unlike in 1995 and 1996, still runs both the House and Senate.
It also will be harder to make Republicans take a full share of responsibility when they are still in the minority. A reasonable guess is that Mr. Obama will reposition himself, though not as drastically as did his Democratic predecessor.
[In 1994 and today,] a political statement made by voters seemed to invite a rethink of strategy and tactics.
The conventional wisdom says Mr. Clinton responded to that 1994 debacle by moving to the political center. In the parlance of the time, he began to "triangulate," or to take stands that positioned him between liberals of his own party and conservatives of the Republican Party.
That's certainly true, but a bit of an oversimplification. Mr. Clinton didn't simply reposition himself, but also shifted his priorities.
Famously, of course, he left behind efforts to overhaul health care. Then, in 1995, Mr. Clinton went against his party's orthodoxy by embracing a plan to balance the federal budget. And in 1996, he moved against Democratic orthodoxy again, by embracing a plan for wholesale changes to the welfare system.
He hardly turned his back on his own party in the process, though. Instead, he embraced more-conservative goals, while sometimes rejecting Republican tactics for achieving them. Thus, though he agreed on a plan to balance the budget, he confronted the GOP from the left on the specifics of spending bills designed to get that done. He vetoed a series of appropriations bills in 1995, ultimately leading to a temporary shutdown of much of the federal government that fall—which turned into a political disaster for Republicans, who absorbed most of the blame for letting it happen.
He also vetoed two versions of a welfare overhaul before finally signing a third in late 1996. Changing welfare was politically popular and, again, Mr. Clinton was the most obvious political beneficiary of the exercise.
In sum, Mr. Clinton engaged the opposition in a substantive way, while also reserving the right to battle with them over specifics. That repositioned the Clinton White House politically, of course, but also had the effect of compelling the Republicans to take a full share of responsibility. By engaging Republicans, in effect, he forced them to take a stake in failure as well as success.
So how much of this script could Mr. Obama follow? In his initial response to the Massachusetts loss, there was a hint of a move to the political center, particularly in his suggestion that he reposition himself on health care.
Similarly, the White House's emerging new focus on attacking the budget deficit will reposition Mr. Obama toward the middle on an issue that has great appeal there right now.
On other hand, the White House's move to double down on more regulation of big banks presages a much harder populist line, which is less in keeping with the Clinton reaction. And obviously, Mr. Obama simply can't move too far away from his party's congressional wing, which today, unlike in 1995 and 1996, still runs both the House and Senate.
It also will be harder to make Republicans take a full share of responsibility when they are still in the minority. A reasonable guess is that Mr. Obama will reposition himself, though not as drastically as did his Democratic predecessor.
posted by Sid Cottingham | 1:34 PM
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