In all likelihood, Mr. Madoff was not running a pure Ponzi scheme, but had real assets. But later had to double down.

An opinion from Wednesday's edition of The Wall Street Journal:

Where was the SEC? Such is the plaint lofted in the wake of the Bernie Madoff scandal.

Huh?

When has the Securities and Exchange Commission ever found a fraud except by reading about it in the newspapers? Anyway, who said the agency was supposed to prevent investors from losing money or relieve them of having to perform due diligence?

Mr. Madoff's many honorable and accomplished clients chose to deal with their man outside the institutional checks that come from, say, a heavily regulated bank or a highly transparent mutual fund, perhaps one whose parent is also publicly traded and doubly subject to the checks of a watchful stock market. That was their choice.

It is common to wax nostalgic for a time when a man's word was his bond, business was done on a handshake, etc. This is poppycock. It has always been a client's job to sort out the dealer who could be trusted from the one who couldn't. Personal connections may give comfort, but are no substitute for true institutional checks or true experience of a man's character, which many of Mr. Madoff's clients seemed not to have.

Instead, they went on "reputation," which is to say they acquired their faith in Mr. Madoff more or less the way people acquire their faith in global warming and many other things, from people equally as ignorant as they.

What makes the Madoff story interesting, though not evidence of systematic failure of the regulatory or legal system, is that Mr. Madoff and some of his clients had dealt on a basis of trust for more than a generation. True Ponzi schemes, in which early investors are paid a "return" out of funds deposited by later investors, tend to falter at the first market downturn. Waning investor enthusiasm dries up new funds required to pay off earlier investors. The scheme collapses.

In all likelihood, Mr. Madoff was not running a pure Ponzi scheme, but had real assets. He was operating a blind pool, in which investors had no real idea what they owned or how it was performing, relying on Mr. Madoff who reported metronomic returns, brooked no nosiness into his methods, and seemed always willing to pay off investors who wanted to withdraw their money.

He may have been casual from the start about what money he used to pay withdrawals. It is almost inconceivable, though, that he could have built a true Ponzi scheme to a height of $50 billion, in which there were never any real assets, just his superhuman 40-year juggling act to ensure new investors were recruited as needed to provide funds to meet withdrawal requests from earlier investors.

If so, he is a genius who should immediately be put in charge of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds.

It was Mr. Madoff himself who apparently applied the word "Ponzi" to his crime, in his distraught confession to his sons. His "$50 billion" in reputed losses also appear to be little more than hearsay, his own tremulous characterization of the long-running disaster he'd wrought.

More likely, his firm devolved into a Ponzi scheme only when serious losses hit and he decided not to level with investors but to gamble on a resurrection. The hoped-for rebound, as they frequently do, failed to materialize. His losses grew. Then came a flood of redemption requests amid the current credit crisis. Mr. Madoff's jig was up.

His decision-making at this crossroads probably wasn't helped by the fact that, in the early 2000s, just as the long bull run was ending, the press began asking questions about the improbable consistency of his reported returns -- making it an awkward moment to stop reporting consistent returns.

Conscious of his standing in the community and seeing jail beckoning, all he could think to do was double down.

There are costs and benefits to everything, including the cumbersome apparatus of firms that subject themselves to intrusive monitoring and conform to standards of transparency. Mr. Madoff's clients chose to avoid those costs. For that matter, they chose to forgo lower but safer returns, as many rich people do, by entrusting their fortunes to T-bills.

The herding automatons of the media can never encounter lawbreaking in the financial markets without concluding that it demonstrates the necessity of more laws against lawbreaking. Congress, now in the process of convincing itself it should run the auto industry, no doubt will see in Mr. Madoff proof that Congress is needed to manage rich people's money and ordinary people's too. Then we'll all be in the same position as Mr. Madoff's clients.